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Abstract. Can there be higher level laws of nature even though everything is re-
ducible to the fundamental laws of physics? The computer science notion of level 
of abstraction explains how there can be.  
1. Introduction 
When a male Emperor penguin stands for two frigid months balancing an egg on 
its feet to keep it from freezing, are we to understand that behavior in terms of 
quarks and other fundamental particles? It seems unreasonable, but that’s the re-
ductionist position. Here’s how Albert Einstein put it. [5]  
The painter, the poet, the speculative philosopher, and the natural scientist … each in his 
own fashion, tries to make for himself .. a simplified and intelligible picture of the world. 
What place does the theoretical physicist's picture of the world occupy among these? … 
In regard to his subject matter … the physicist … must content himself with describing 
the most simple events which can be brought within the domain of our experience … . 
But what can be the attraction of getting to know such a tiny section of nature thoroughly, 
while one leaves everything subtler and more complex shyly and timidly alone? Does the 
product of such a modest effort deserve to be called by the proud name of a theory of the 
universe?  
In my belief the name is justified; for the general laws on which the structure of 
theoretical physics is based claim to be valid for any natural phenomenon whatsoever. 
With them, it ought to be possible to arrive at … the  theory of every natural process, 
including life, by means of pure deduction.  …  The supreme task of the physicist is to 
arrive at those elementary universal laws from which the cosmos can be built up by pure 
deduction. [emphasis added] 
The italicized portion expresses what Philip Anderson [4] calls the construc-
tionist hypothesis: the idea that one can start with physics and reconstruct the un-
iverse. 
More recently Steven Weinberg [10] restated Einstein’s position as follows.  
Grand reductionism is … the view that all of nature is the way it is … because of simple 
universal laws, to which all other scientific laws may in some sense be reduced. …  
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[For example,] the reductionist regards the general theories governing air and water and 
radiation as being at a deeper level than theories about cold fronts or thunderstorms … 
[T]he latter can in principle be understood as mathematical consequences of the former. 
… [T]here are no autonomous laws of weather that are logically independent of the 
principles of physics. …  
Every field of science operates by formulating and testing generalizations that are 
sometimes dignified by being called principles or laws. … But there are no principles of 
chemistry that simply stand on their own, without needing to be explained reductively 
from the properties of electrons and atomic nuclei, and … there are no principles of 
psychology that are free-standing, in the sense that they do not need ultimately to be 
understood through the study of the human brain, which in turn must ultimately be 
understood on the basis of physics and chemistry. 
Not all physicists agree with Einstein and Weinberg. As Erwin Schrödinger [8] 
wrote,  
[L]iving matter, while not eluding the 'laws of physics' … is likely to involve 'other laws,' 
[which] will form just as integral a part of [its] science. 
In arguing against the constructionist hypothesis Anderson extended Schrödin-
ger’s thought. 
[T]he ability to reduce everything to simple fundamental laws … [does not imply] the 
ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe. …  
At each level of complexity entirely new properties appear. … [O]ne may array the 
sciences roughly linearly in [a] hierarchy [in which] the elementary entities of [the 
science at level n+1] obey the laws of [the science at level n]: elementary particle physics, 
solid state (or many body) physics, chemistry, molecular biology, cell biology, …, 
psychology, social sciences. But this hierarchy does not imply that science [n+1] is ‘just 
applied [science n].’ At each [level] entirely new laws, concepts, and generalization are 
necessary. 
Notwithstanding their disagreements, all four physicists (and many others) 
agree that everything can be reduced to the fundamental laws of physics. Here’s 
how Anderson put it. 
[The] workings of all the animate and inanimate matter of which we have any detailed 
knowledge are … controlled by the … fundamental laws [of physics]. … [W]e must all 
start with reductionism, which I fully accept.  
Einstein and Weinberg argue that that’s the end of the story. Starting with the 
laws of physics and with sufficiently powerful deductive machinery one should be 
able to reconstruct the universe. Schrödinger and Anderson disagree. They say 
that there’s more to nature than the laws of physics—but they were unable to say 
what that might be. 
 
Before going on, you may want to answer the question for yourself. Do you 
agree with Einstein and Weinberg or with Schrödinger and Anderson? Is there 
more than physics—and if so, what is it? 
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2. Preview 
The title of this paper gives away my position. I agree with Schrödinger and An-
derson.  
The computer science notion of level of abstraction explains how there can be 
higher level laws of nature—even though everything is reducible to the fundamen-
tal laws of physics. The basic idea is that a level of abstraction has both a specifi-
cation and an implementation. The implementation is a reduction of the specifica-
tion to lower level functionality. But the specification is independent of the 
implementation. So even though a level of abstraction depends on lower level 
phenomena for its realization it cannot be reduced to that implementation without 
losing something important, namely its specification.  
This demonstrates, as Wing [11] pointed out, that conceptual tools developed 
by computer scientists can apply more broadly. 
3. Levels of abstraction 
A level of abstraction (see [6]) is (a) a collection of types—which for the most 
part means categories—and (b) operations that may be applied to entities of those 
types. A standard example is the stack, which is defined by the following opera-
tions.  
push(stack: s, element: e)    — Push an element e into a stack s and return the stack. 
pop(stack: s)   — Pop the top element off the stack s and return the stack. 
top(stack: s)    — Return (but don't pop) the top element of a stack s. 
Although the intuitive descriptions are important for us as readers, all we have 
done so far is to declare a number of operations. How are their meanings defined? 
Axiomatically.  
top(push(stack: s, element: e)) = e.    
  — The top element of s after e id pushed onto it is e. 
pop(push(stack: s, element: e) = s.     
  — After pushing e onto s and then popping it off, s remains. 
Together, these declarations and axioms define a stack as anything to which the 
operations can be applied while satisfying the axioms.  
This is similar to how mathematics is axiomatized. Consider the non-negative 
integers as specified by Peano’s axioms.1  
1. Zero is a number. 
2. If A is a number, the successor of A is a number. 
3. Zero is not the successor of a number. 
4. Two numbers of which the successors are equal are themselves equal. 
                                                          
1
 As given in Wolfram’s MathWorld: http://mathworld.wolfram.com/PeanosAxioms.html.  
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5. (Induction axiom) If a set S of numbers contains zero and also the successor 
of every number in S, then every number is in S.  
These axioms specify the terms zero, number, and successor. Here number is a 
type, Zero is an entity of that type, and successor is an operation on numbers. 
These terms stand on their own and mean (formally) no more or less than the defi-
nitions say they mean.  
Notice that in neither of these definitions were the new terms defined in terms 
of pre-existing terms. Neither a number nor a stack is defined as a special kind of 
something else. Both Peano’s axioms and the stack definition define terms by es-
tablishing relationships among them. The terms themselves, stack and a number, 
are defined ab initio and solely in terms of operations and relationships among 
those operations. 
This is characteristic of levels of abstraction. When specifying a level of ab-
straction the types, objects, operations, and relationships at that level stand on 
their own. They are not defined in terms of lower level types, objects, operations, 
and relationships. 
4. Unsolvability and the Game of Life 
The Game of Life is a 2-dimensional cellular automaton in which cells are either 
alive (on) or dead (off). Cells turn on or off synchronously in discrete time steps 
according to the following rules.  
• Any cell with exactly three live neighbors will stay alive or become alive.  
• Any live cell with exactly two live neighbors will stay alive.  
• All other cells die.  
In a Game of Life universe the preceding rules are analogous to the fundamen-
tal laws of physics. They determine everything that happens on a Game of Life 
grid.  
Certain on-off cell configurations create patterns—or really sequences of pat-
terns. The glider is the best known. When a glider is entered onto an empty grid 
and the rules applied, a series of patterns propagates across the grid. Since nothing 
actually moves in the Game of Life—the concept of motion doesn’t even exist—
how should we understand this?  
Gliders exist on a different level of abstraction from that of the Game of Life. 
At the Game of Life level there is nothing but grid cells—in fixed positions. But at 
the glider level not only do gliders move, one can even write equations for the 
number of time steps it will take a glider to move from one location to another and 
when a glider will “turn on” a particular cell. What is the status of such equations?  
Before answering that question, recall that it’s possible to implement Turing 
machines by arranging gliders and other Game of Life patterns. Just as gliders are 
subject to the laws of glider equations, Turing machines too are subject to their 
own laws—in particular, computability theory.   
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Game of Life gliders and Turing machines exemplify the situation described by 
Schrödinger and Anderson. While not eluding the Game of Life rules, in both cas-
es autonomous new laws apply to phenomena that (a) appear on a Game of Life 
grid but (b) are defined on a different and independent level of abstraction. These 
additional laws are not expressible in Game of Life terms. There is no such thing 
as a glider or a Turing machine at the Game of Life level. The Game of Life is 
nothing but a grid of cells along with rules that determine when cells go on and 
off.  
But higher level laws are not disconnected from Game of Life elements. Be-
cause the halting problem is unsolvable, it is unsolvable whether an arbitrary 
Game of Life configuration will ever reach a stable state. Similarly, glider equa-
tions let us predict when a glider will “turn on” a particular cell.  
When autonomous higher level laws apparently effect lower level phenomena 
the result has been called [3] downward causation. But downward causation 
doesn’t make scientific sense. It is always the lower level phenomena that deter-
mine the higher level: the Game of Life rules are the only things that determine 
whether cells go on or off. So how can computability theory and glider equations 
let us draw conclusions about whether cells will go on or off? In [1] I call this 
downward entailment. Autonomous laws that apply at a higher level of abstrac-
tions can have implications for elements at a lower level when the lower level im-
plements the higher level.  
5. Evolution is also a property of a level of abstraction 
The Game of Life is an abstraction. Evolution, a real-world phenomenon, is also a 
property of a level of abstraction.  
Evolution occurs in the context of a population of entities. The entities exist in 
an environment within which they may survive and reproduce. The entities have 
properties that affect how they interact with their environment. Those interactions 
help determine whether the entities will survive and reproduce. When an entity 
reproduces, it produces offspring which inherit its properties, possibly along with 
some random variations, which may result in new properties. In some cases, pairs 
of entities reproduce jointly, in which case the offspring inherit some combination 
of their parent’s properties—also with the possibility of random variations.  
The more likely an entity is to survive and reproduce, the more likely it is that 
the properties that enabled it to survive and reproduce will be passed on to its 
offspring. If certain properties—or random variations of those properties, or the 
random creation of new properties—enable their possessors to survive and repro-
duce more effectively, those properties will propagate. We call the generation and 
propagation of successful properties evolution. By helping to determine which ent-
ities are more likely to survive and reproduce, the environment effectively selects 
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the properties to be propagated—hence evolution by environmental (i.e., natural) 
selection.  
The preceding description introduced a number of terms (in italics). If elabo-
rated, the terms could be defined more formally. As in the case of stacks and Pea-
no numbers, the new terms are defined ab initio at the evolution level of abstrac-
tion.  
The great contribution of Darwin and Wallace was to describe the evolution 
level of abstraction. They did so even though they knew nothing about DNA. But 
since their model required some mechanism for recording and transmitting proper-
ties, a prediction of their model is that any implementation of the evolution level 
of abstraction must provide such a mechanism. We now know that for biological 
organisms DNA is that mechanism. Prediction confirmed—at least in this case. 
6. The reductionist blind spot 
Physics recognizes four fundamental forces. Evolution is not one of them. Similar-
ly there is no “computational functionality” in a Game of Life universe. Neither 
evolution nor computation have any causal power; they are both epiphenomenal. 
Do we need them? In some sense we don’t. 
Game of Life Turing machines don’t do anything. It is only the Game of Life 
rules that make cells go on and off. Reductionism has not been overthrown. One 
could trace the sequence of Game of Life rule applications that transform an initial 
Game of Life configuration (which could be described as a Turing machine with 
input x) into a final configuration (which could be described as a Turing machine 
with output y). One could do this with no mention of Turing machines, tapes, 
symbols, etc. 
Similarly one could presumably—albeit with great difficulty—trace the se-
quence of chemical and physical reactions and interactions that produce a particu-
lar chemical configuration (which could be described as the DNA that enables its 
possessor to thrive in its environment). One could do this with no mention of 
genes, codons, proteins, etc. 
One can always reduce away macro-level terminology and phenomena and re-
place them with the underlying micro-level terminology and phenomena. It is still 
the elementary mechanisms—and nothing but those mechanisms—that turn the 
causal crank. So why not reduce away epiphenomenal levels of abstraction? 
Reducing away a level of abstraction produces a reductionist blind spot. Com-
putations performed by Game of Life Turing machines cannot be described as 
computations when one is limited to the vocabulary available at the Game of Life 
level of abstraction. Nor can one explain why the Game of Life halting problem is 
unsolvable. These concepts exist only at the Turing machine level of abstraction. 
Similarly, biological evolution cannot be explicated at the physics and chemistry 
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level of abstraction. The evolutionary process exists only at the evolution level of 
abstraction. 
Furthermore, reducing away a level of abstraction throws away elements of na-
ture that have objective existence. At each level of abstraction there are entities, 
such as Turing machines and biological organisms, that instantiate types at that 
level. These entities are simultaneously causally reducible and ontologically 
real—a phrase coined by Searle [8] in another context. Entities on a level of ab-
straction that are implemented by a lower level of abstraction are causally reduci-
ble because the implementation provides the forces and mechanisms that drive 
them. But such entities are ontologically real because their specifications charac-
terize what they do.  
Weinberg argues that higher level entities like cold fronts and thunderstorms 
are just conceptual conveniences. Are they? Robert Laughlin [7] argues that high-
er level entities are objectively real. He talks about what he calls “protectorates,” 
including both the solid state of matter and Newtonian physics. Like computation 
and evolution, protectorates exhibit properties that simply don’t have a meaning at 
lower levels. For example, the solid state of matter includes concepts—such as 
hardness, shear strength, torque, tensile strength, load bearing ability, etc.—that 
are meaningless at the level of elementary particle physics. Newtonian mechanics 
similarly has properties of its own. Laughlin emphasizes that protectorates are not 
approximations of lower level phenomena—Newtonian physics is not an approx-
imation of quantum mechanics. They are new conceptual domains that obey new 
laws.  
Higher level entities are objectively real in two additional ways. They have re-
duced entropy, and they have either more mass or less mass than their components 
considered separately. In [1] and [2] I discuss the two types of higher level enti-
ties: static entities and dynamic entities. Static entities persist in a reduced entropy 
state because they are in an energy well. Atoms, molecules, solar systems, etc. are 
examples. Because they are in an energy well, static entities have less mass than 
the aggregation of their components considered separately.  
Dynamic entities persist in a reduced entropy state by extracting energy from 
the environment. Biological and social entities are examples. (Hurricanes are the 
only naturally occurring non-biological and non-social dynamic entity of which I 
am aware.) Because dynamic entities have energy flowing through them, they 
have more mass than the aggregation of their components considered separately.  
These considerations convince me that one is justified in considering these 
higher level entities as objectively real and more than just conceptual conve-
niences.   
The goal of science is to understand nature. Reducing away levels of abstrac-
tion discards both real scientific explanations—such as the evolutionary mechan-
ism—and objectively real entities—such as biological organisms. Reducing away 
levels of abstraction is bad science. 
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7. Constructionism and the principle of ontological emergence 
Levels of abstraction illustrate Schrödinger’s perception that although higher level 
phenomena don’t elude the laws of physics they are governed by new laws. Be-
cause higher level laws are not derived from the laws governing the implementing 
level, knowledge of the lower level laws does not enable one to generate a specifi-
cation and implementation of the higher level. In other words, constructionism 
fails. No matter how much deductive power one has available, one would not ex-
pect to be able to generate, for example, the specification and implementation of a 
web browser given the specification of logic gates—or the specification and im-
plementation of biological organisms given fundamental physics. Besides, why a 
web browser rather than, say, Linux? Why not both, or all three? 
But in another sense constructionism succeeds. It has taken billions of years, 
but nature has implemented biological organisms—and web browsers and Linux. 
And it did so starting from quantum mechanics. If one considers nature a mechan-
ism that generates and implements possible levels of abstraction, then nature em-
bodies constructionism—although as the random enumeration of possibilities and 
not in the deductive/explanatory sense suggested by Einstein and Weinberg. 
Nature generates multiple interrelated levels of abstractions. Which levels of 
abstraction persist? It depends on the environment. Molecules persist only in envi-
ronments with low enough temperatures; biological organisms persist only in en-
vironments that provide nourishment; and hurricanes persist only in environments 
with a supply of warm water. This can be summarized as the principle of ontolog-
ical emergence: extant levels of abstraction are those whose implementations have 
materialized and whose environments enable—or at least do not prevent—their 
persistence.  
8. Summary  
The need to understand and describe complex systems led computer scientists to 
develop concepts that clarify issues beyond computer science. In particular, the 
notion of the level of abstraction explains how higher level laws of nature help 
govern a reductionist universe.  
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(Sidebar) Mathematics, science, and engineering (including 
computer science)  
The notion of the level of abstraction suggests characterization of the similarities 
and differences among mathematics, science, engineering, and computer science.  
Mathematics is the study of the entities and operations defined on various le-
vels of abstraction—whether or not those levels of abstraction are implemented. 
Mathematicians devise formal (or at least “rigorous”) specifications of levels of 
abstraction—such as Peano’s non-negative integers. They then study the conse-
quences of those specifications—which in the case of Peano’s axioms is number 
theory.  
Science is (a) the characterization of observed natural phenomena as levels of 
abstraction, i.e., the framing of observed phenomena as patterns, followed by (b) a 
determination of how those levels of abstraction are implemented by lower level 
mechanisms. 
Engineering (including computer science) is the imagination and implementa-
tion of new levels of abstraction. The levels of abstraction that engineers and 
computer scientists implement are almost always defined informally—most real-
world systems are too complex to specify formally. They are characterized as re-
quirements, natural language descriptions of required functional and performance 
10  
properties. Engineers and computer scientists implement systems that meet re-
quirements. 
Whereas engineers and computer scientists imagine and implement new levels 
of abstraction, scientists identify existing levels of abstraction and discover the 
mechanisms nature uses to implement them. In other words, science is the reverse 
engineering of nature. 
Why did computer science rather than engineering develop the notion of level 
of abstraction? Computer scientists start from a well defined base level of abstrac-
tion—the bit and the logical operations defined on it—and build new levels of ab-
straction upwards from that base. Engineers work with physical objects imple-
mented at multiple and arbitrary levels of abstraction. Since there is no 
engineering base level of abstraction, engineers construct mathematical models 
that approximate nature downwards as far as necessary to ensure that the systems 
they build have reliable physical foundations. (See [1].) 
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(Sidebar) Constraints, software, broken symmetry, and conceptual 
models 
The definitions of the stack and Peano numbers are given in terms of types, opera-
tions, and constraints. To implement a level of abstraction is to impose constraints 
on the implementation level—similar to the constraints imposed on a computer by 
a software application. By guiding a computer’s operation, the application con-
strains the range of states and state trajectories the computer may assume—a con-
structive form of symmetry breaking. These constraints—i.e., the application’s 
conceptual model—determine the allowable states, their relationships, and the 
transitions among relationship, i.e., the higher level laws, that may occur within 
the conceptual model.  
 
 
